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Abstract
Guidelines for different qualitative research genres
have been proposed in information systems (IS). As these
guidelines are outlined for conducting and evaluating
good research, studies may be denied publication simply
because they do not follow a prescribed methodology.
This can result in “checkbox” compliance, where the
guidelines become more important than the study. We
argue that guidelines can only be used to evaluate what
good research is if there is evidence that they lead to
certain good research outcomes. Currently, the
guidelines do not present such evidence. Instead, when it
is presented, the evidence is often an authority argument
or evidence of popularity with usability examples. We
further postulate that such evidence linking guidelines
and outcomes cannot be presented. Therefore, it may be
time for the IS research community to acknowledge that
many research method principles we regard as
authoritative may ultimately be based on speculation and
opinion, and thus, they should be taken less seriously as
absolute guidelines in the review process.

1. Introduction
In the information systems (IS) field, there is a
perception that only positivistic research methods are
“legitimate methods for use in social science” [1 p. 343].
Such positivistic methods include “inferential statistics,
hypothesis testing, mathematical analyses, and
experimental and quasi-experimental design” [1 p. 343].
Although such views may not be truly positivistic [2], it
is understandable that scholars engaged in qualitative IS
research report significant difficulty in meeting these
beliefs in publishing qualitative research. Many
qualitative IS scholars reacted to these perceptions by
writing methodological articles aimed at rendering
qualitative research “scientific” or publishable [3, 4]. For
example, Lee [5] proposed a case study methodology to
meet the standards of the “positivistic” natural science
model of scientific research. Klein and Myers [6]
reported that, “while the conventions for evaluating
information systems case studies conducted according to
the natural science model of social science are now
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widely accepted, this is not the case for interpretive field
studies” [p. 67]. To ensure IS acceptance of interpretive
research, these authors proposed principles for
conducting and evaluating interpretive research.
A similar trend has occurred for conducting and
evaluating design-science research [7]. Later, similar
guidelines were outlined for mixed-methods research by
Venkatesh: “there is a dearth of mixed methods research
in information systems” [8 p. 1] and a lack of “guidelines
for conducting and evaluating mixed methods
[research].” To increase publication of mixed-methods
research, these authors proposed guidelines for
conducting mixed-methods research in IS studies.
We do not doubt that the guidelines described above
have helped IS scholars in publishing qualitative, mixedmethods, and design-science research. The downside is
that the guidelines can also prevent the publication of
such research, as reviewers can interpret them as absolute
dogma regulating what is acceptable (rigorous) and what
is not acceptable IS research. The guidelines can be
easily read in this way. For example, it is noted that
“guidelines should be addressed in some manner for
design-science research to be complete” [7 p. 82]. To
give another example, Venkatesh et al. [8] provided a
normative view that “IS researchers should employ a
mixed-methods approach only when they intend to
provide a holistic understanding of a phenomenon for
which extant research is fragmented, inconclusive, and
equivocal” [p. 36]. This implies that, in other situations,
mixed methods should not be used.
Given that the guidelines can be interpreted as
normative, it is currently the case that IS scholars
“produce knowledge that seeks to get through reviewers
looking to check boxes on theory and method” [9 p. 275].
Fitzgerald [10] reported that, during the doctoral
consortium of the International Conference on Software
Engineering, “research method was mentioned just once
(and that was by a student) and the focus was much more
on the actual content of the research.” He stated that,
when he attended the doctoral consortium of the
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS),
“more than 50% of the time involved discussions of
research method issues. However, I do not necessarily
think that this was time well-spent.”
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In the IS field, the perception that it is important to
adhere to correct research method principles (RMPs) as
a hallmark of science is understandable. Influential
scientific thinkers, such as Comte, Bain, Jevons,
Helmholtz, and Mach, thought that the scientific method
is necessary for the success of science [11]. Logical
positivists even suggested that the use of a scientific
method distinguishes science from pseudoscience [12].
However, numerous philosophers, such as Feyerabend
[13], have reported that strict methodological principles
restrict innovation, thereby hindering scientific
breakthroughs.
This study reviews some of the research method
guidelines (RMGs) in IS. We also review the philosophy
of science regarding RMGs. We end by presenting a
naturalistic approach to RMGs in IS, in which RMGs are
regarded as either scientific hypotheses with evidence or
idealizations. The first approach requires evidence that
each principle leads to a specific outcome. We maintain
that such evidence cannot be provided in indeterministic
settings, such as in IS (qualitative) research. As a result,
we postulate that RMGs are idealized and may have
various benefits for educational purposes. Having said
that, it is debatable whether they can be used to evaluate
the quality of research.

2. Methodological
guidelines
qualitative-oriented IS research

for

We first explain RMGs and RMPs, and then we
review three guidelines for research in IS. We point out
that these guidelines are outlined as criteria for good or
high-quality research. Finally, we review what evidence
they provide to back up their claim that they can be used
as guidelines on how to conduct and evaluate research.

2.1. RMGs and RMPs
In the philosophy of science, RMPs and RMGs
belong to the “theory of scientific methodology” [14 p.
3], which we review in section 3. There is no common
definition for RMPs and RMGs in the philosophy of
science. Roughly speaking, RMPs are concerned with
“how scientific theories in general are appraised and
validated” [14 p. 3]. What can be regarded as RMPs
varies from one author to another in the philosophy of
science. We characterize RMPs as any principles that
provide normative guidance on how good research is
conducted or evaluated (or both).
In IS, RMPs can vary from requiring certain tests, pvalues, and sample sizes to requiring normative

statements about which conditions of qualitative research
are acceptable for mixed-methods studies. An RMG
consists of one or more RMPs; thus, broadly speaking,
an RMG is a collection of RMPs. For example, Klein and
Myers [6] suggested nine principles for interpretive
research; each of these principles is an RMP, according
to our terminology, while the complete list of principles
is regarded as an RMG.

2.2. Guidelines for conducting and evaluating
high-quality, rigorous research
Considering that the IS literature is prolific when it
comes to research methodology guidelines, in this
section, we focus primarily on three commonly known
and widely cited normative criteria. These are Klein and
Myers’s [6] criteria for interpretive field studies, Hevner
et al.’s [7] criteria for design science, and Venkatesh et
al.’s [8] criteria for mixed research. We discuss these
guidelines below.
Hevner et al. [7] conducted a study “to inform the
community of IS researchers and practitioners of how to
conduct, evaluate, and present design-science research
… by developing a set of guidelines for conducting and
evaluating good design-science research” [p. 77]. Hevner
[15] also reported that “it is vital that we as a research
community provide clear and consistent guidelines for
the design and execution of high quality design science
research projects” [p. 87]. Similarly, Klein and Myers [6]
noted that “[a]s the interest in interpretive research has
increased … researchers, reviewers, and editors have
raised questions about how interpretive field research
should be conducted and how its quality can be assessed”
[p. 67]. Mixed method guidelines have similar goals. For
instance, Venkatesh et al. [8] offered “a set of guidelines
for conducting and evaluating mixed methods research
in IS … to initiate and facilitate discourse on mixed
methods research in IS and encourage and assist IS
researchers to conduct rigorous mixed methods research”
[p. 2]1.
Grounded theory guidelines [16] are “guidelines for
conducting and evaluating grounded theory studies in
information systems” [p. 358], and they should “clarify
what good grounded theory might look like” [16 p. 368].
These guidelines “address how the researcher might
achieve the degree of conceptualization necessary to
build a good theory” [16 p. 368].
To summarize, given the guidelines’ statements, it is
easy to understand that, in the hands of reviewers, when
IS research does not meet these guidelines, the
research—rather than the guidelines—is often blamed as
being of low quality. When the guidelines are not met,

1

Venkatesh et al. [8] also “offer a set of guidelines for IS researchers
to consider in making decisions regarding whether to employ a mixed
methods approach in their research” [p. 15].
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the jargon used by reviewers, for example, may include
the criticism of a “lack of methodological rigor.”
Furthermore, considering that these guidelines are
advocated as procedures for evaluating and conducting
good or high-quality (qualitative, interpretive, or designscience) research, we need to ask what evidence they are
based on. This is considered in the next subsection.

2.3. Evidence supporting the use of guidelines
Typically, RMG articles require a legitimization
strategy, which usually involves arguing that the
proposed guidelines have the following characteristics:
1) they are consistent with previous research(ers); 2)
popular among a group of researchers; 3) used by one or
more published paper(s); and/or 4) can be used by future
researchers. However, these RMG articles fail to
mention that the guidelines do not provide evidence for
better outcomes or performance compared with
approaches that do not follow the guidelines. Below, we
discuss these issues in more detail.
2.3.1 Consistency is not evidence of outcomes. Many
guidelines use the rhetoric of being consistent with some
articles or researchers. For example, Klein and Myers [6]
justify their guidelines as follows: the “proposed
principles are consistent with a considerable part of the
philosophical base of literature on interpretivism and
hence an improvement over the status quo” [p. 68].
(However, they do not show concretely that their
principles “are consistent with a considerable part of the
philosophical base of literature on interpretivism.”)
Readers should understand that showing consistency
is not good practice for scientific justification. Consider
the following well-known thesis: The earth is flat. Then,
consider the following argument: The earth is flat
because this view is consistent with Carpenter [17].
(William Carpenter [17] advocated the theory that the
Earth is flat.) It is true that this argument is consistent
with Carpenter [17]; however, who would accept this as
evidence that the Earth is flat?
In scientific research, it is not a good justification
practice for researchers to base their arguments on
references that are merely consistent with their opinions.
This is because justifying claims by stating consistency
with a previous study does not require the presentation
of evidence for or against the claim. By analogy,
proposing a principle for conducting and evaluating
high-quality research, be it qualitative, mixed method, or
design science, should require the presentation of
available evidence for and against each principle. We

2

Klein and Myers [6] used “three published examples of interpretive
field research from the IS research literature … in order to demonstrate
how authors, reviewers, and editors can apply the principles” [p. 79].

argue that scientific research should provide the evidence
for and against something. This should not be replaced
by someone’s opinion (without evidence) and references
that are consistent with these opinions.
2.3.2 Evidence of use or usability. As exemplified by
[6], [7], and [8], RMGs commonly present examples
demonstrating the applicability of guidelines 2 by
providing evidence supporting their use. However,
evidence for use should not be confused with the quality
of research or demonstrating cause and effect. We
illustrate this in the examples below.
It was once thought that cancer was contagious
(contagious cancer theory), spreading from one
individual to another. The practical implication
(preventive treatment) of the contagious cancer theory
was that patients should be isolated to avoid the spread
of the cancer. Let us presume that one follows this
practice, that is, isolates the patients. This procedure—
the act of isolating the patient successfully—does not
mean that isolating patients with cancer is proof that
cancer is contagious. To give an even simpler and more
provocative example, let us presume that one is
diagnosed with cancer, and the treatment advice is to
walk one mile every day. If one can do that, it
demonstrates that the actions are doable (for this person
at least); however, the fact that one is able to walk for
one mile is not evidence that this is a good cancer
treatment. Similarly, how many times the paper is cited
should not be conflated with evidence of the outcome.
The popularity of a claim is not evidence that the claim
is true.
The takeaway point is that many IS RMGs—at least
those reviewed here, namely [6], [7], and [8]—either
provide some evidence that an RMP has been used or
demonstrate how an RMP can be used. These measures
can be useful for pedagogical purposes, but they are not
evidence on cause and effect or good outcomes. Such
information cannot be used to claim that these guidelines
are appropriate for evaluating and conducting good or
high-quality (interpretive, mixed-method, or designscience) research.
2.3.3 Contradictory statements create confusion.
Readers of the guidelines may find some statements
confusing. For example, on the one hand, Hevner et al.
[7] “advised against mandatory or rote use of the
guidelines” [p. 82]. On the other, they suggested that
“[r]esearchers, reviewers, and editors must use their
creative skills and judgment to determine when, where,
and how to apply each of the guidelines in a specific
Hevner et al. [7] also used three examples: “we use the proposed
guidelines to assess recent exemplar papers published in the IS
literature in order to illustrate how authors, reviewers, and editors can
apply them consistently” [p. 78].
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research project” [ibid, p. 82]. Similarly, Klein and
Myers [6] cautioned that “principles are not like
bureaucratic rules of conduct, because the application of
one or more of them still requires considerable creative
thought … [I]t is incumbent upon authors, reviewers, and
editors to exercise their judgment and discretion in
deciding whether, how, and which of the principles
should be applied and appropriated in any given research
project” [p. 71]. While this indicates some flexibility in
guideline application, these researchers also noted that,
“while we believe that none of our principles should be
left out arbitrarily, researchers need to work out
themselves how (and which of) the principles apply in
any particular situation” [p. 78]. Omitting principles is an
arbitrary action if no guidelines are provided. In addition,
Klein and Myers [6] reported a set of guidelines for how
“interpretive field research should be conducted and how
its quality can be assessed” [p. 67] that “require
considerable creative thought” [p. 78] and application
based on individual perceptions of individual cases.
However, this raises the following question: If their
application requires considerable creative thought case
by case, then how can these principles provide guidelines
for how research “should be conducted and how its
quality can be assessed” [p. 67]?
To summarize, the guideline proposals create
confusion in several ways. First, if principles require
situational adaptations, but no guidelines are provided to
make such adaptions, then the principles cannot help
provide adequate evaluations of qualitative studies.
Principles lose value for research evaluation when
situational adaptations based on personal judgment are
required. For instance, Klein and Myers’s [6] suggestion
that principles should “leave open the possibility that
other authors may suggest additional sets of principles”
[p. 68] seems to oppose the evaluation of the qualitative
research’s quality. Second, if principles “require
considerable creative thought” and case-by-case
consideration, then how can they be used to determine
research quality? Before we present our view on the role
of these guidelines in providing norms for conducting
and evaluating research, we briefly review what
philosophy of science has to say about RMPs.

3. Philosophical foundations for research
methods
This section reviews the philosophy of science
underlying RMPs.

3.1. The necessity of an absolute research
method
In this section, selected attempts to build an absolute
research method are presented, and the perspectives that

have inspired arguments against logical positivists are
discussed to show how building an absolute
methodology for scientific research has failed. Some
objections have come from logical positivists themselves
(i.e., Carnap and Neurath) [2]; however, the most wellknown objections have been provided by outsiders,
including Quine’s [18] dogma of reductionism, Kuhn’s
[19] methodological subjectivity, and various theses by
Hanson [20], and Feyerabend [13]; see [2].
3.1.1. Aristotle: Critical thinking leads to absolute
certainty. Aristotle considered that scientific knowledge
can be separated from opinion and superstition with
absolute certainty through critical thinking [11]. For
Aristotle, scientific knowledge was absolute and
infallible [21]. However, later scientific progress cast
serious doubts on this view [22, 23], as new scientific
theories and studies kept challenging existing scientific
views once regarded as infallible or self-evident [23, 14].
3.1.2. Comte, Jevons, Helmholtz, and Mach: Can the
scientific method explain the success of science? When
philosophers realized that scientific knowledge cannot be
certain, specific sciences, such as physics, were
seemingly highly progressive [11]. This raises the
question of why they were successful. Given that
Aristotelian infallible critical thinking was not the
scientific method explaining the success of science,
philosophers like Comte, Jevons, Helmholtz, and Mach
suggested other candidates for the scientific method [11].
However, they could not agree on what this scientific
method was [11]. Even more problematic was that
Duhem [24] showed that proposed RMPs were either not
used or were violated by successful scientists. As science
continued to make breakthroughs in physics and
medicine, interest in understanding this success was high
[11]. Motivated in this way, logical positivists (e.g.,
Schlick, Neurath, and Carnap) suggested that the
scientific method not only explains the success of
science, but it can also be used to differentiate science
from pseudoscience [2]. For example, Schlick [12] put
forward an absolute method known as the verification
method. Logical positivists’ ambition to establish an
absolute and objective method to separate science from
nonsense attracted a lot of criticism, which ultimately
clarified that no method is truly objective. Such criticism
is discussed below.
3.1.3. Insider critique of logical positivism: Neurath
and Carnap. Criticism of absolute RMPs first emerged
in the Vienna Circle. Neurath, and later Carnap, argued
that absolute RMPs were impossible [25], and Carnap
[26] noted that no methodological norm provided
“objective validity” because norms cannot “be
empirically verified or deduced from empirical
propositions; indeed [norms] cannot be affirmed at all”
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[p. 237]. In other words, Carnap deemed the acceptance
of any RMP a matter of taste. This does not mean that
Carnap lacked RMP preferences, as he certainly had
them. Rather, it signifies that Carnap viewed it as
impossible to justify that one RMP is ultimately better
than another [27]. Therefore, for Carnap, RMPs were
“proposals, which no one was obligated to accept” [28].
Similarly, logical empiricist Reichenbach [29] noted that
the aims of science, including the choice of
methodological norms, are ultimately a matter of taste.

3.2. The relativistic critique: Quine, Kuhn,
Hanson, and Feyerabend
The critique outside the logical positivism was better
known than the logical positivists own critique was.
However, this outsiders’ critique was not fatal to the
logical positivism, because positivists had already left
their views behind [27, 30]. Ironically, while the
positivists’ mission of developing an absolute
methodology failed, it also inspired a number of
philosophers to show how the best science was
ultimately based on speculative metaphysics [2]. These
views aimed to illustrate the following: 1) no method
could be absolutely objective [18, 20]; 2) acceptance of
RMPs was irrational, subjective, and a matter of fate
similar to acceptance of religious views [19]; 3) RMPs
were worse than useless [13]; and 4) RMPs were tacit
knowledge that was impossible to present as written
principles [31].
3.2.1. Quine: Verification theory and reductionism.
Quine’s [18] critique pointed out that verification cannot
test a single statement or hypothesis isolated from its
underlying assumptions. That is to say, any test or
observation, no matter how simple and obvious it may
sound, is always associated with a number of underlying
presuppositions that are not empirically testable and
must be assumed. Quine [18] maintained that, when a
claim is tested, a complex web of assumptions and
presuppositions are also tested; thus, he concluded that
any hypothesis can be accepted by revising the
underlying assumptions. Quine’s critique applies to any
test for RMPs.
3.2.2. Kuhn: Fundamental method decisions are
irrational. Kuhn [19] argued against positivists’
absolute views. Kuhn argued that different paradigms in
one scientific discipline have radically different
methodological norms for assessing theories. These

3

Feyerabend [34] noted: “anything goes does not express any
conviction of mine, it is jocular summary of the predicament of the
rationalist: if you want universal standards, I say, if you cannot live
without principles that hold independently of situation, shape of world,

norms are subjective beliefs rather than evidence-based
assertions [19]. Kuhn [19] maintained that, by definition,
the worldview and languages of each paradigm are so
different that one paradigm cannot communicate
methodological rules outside of it. Kuhn claimed that a
change in methodological thinking in physics does not
occur through rational discussions or objective evidence,
and it has nothing to do with the verification method
suggested by positivists [12]. Instead, methodological
changes for assessing theories are irrational, a “leap of
faith,” or comparable to a religious “conversion
experience” [12].
3.2.3. Hanson: Theory-laden observations. The
positivists’ verification method was based on
observation [2]. Hanson [20] took up this point and
argued that all observations are theory laden. For
example, when microscopic images from a biochemistry
journal are viewed, those who have doctorates in
biochemistry see different things in the picture than those
who lack such education [2]. Hanson [20] presented
examples of how, even within one scientific discipline,
different scientists may see different things based on the
same observational evidence available.
3.2.4 Feyerabend: Universal method principles are
worse than useless. Feyerabend [32] examined
breakthroughs in physics. He argued that there are no
universal, predefined, or common methodological rules
in science. He argued that if he had to give one such rule,
it would be “anything goes”; this became his famous
slogan [33], [34]3. See also Treiblmaier [35]. Feyerabend
[13] presented evidence that the best scientists made up
their own RMPs as they proceeded with their research.
Importantly, Feyerabend [13] noted that breaking the
rules for appraising research was not limited to
exceptional cases. Instead, he emphasized that the
scientific elite not only broke all the common and
predefined RMPs, but they also did so frequently [13, p.
23]. Feyerabend’s [13] other important point was that
RMPs restrict theory development: “Science needs
people who are adaptable and inventive, not rigid
imitators of established behavioral patterns” [13, p. 163].
For him, theory development was an invention that
“depends on our talents and other fortuities
circumstances” [13, p. 155], and rules just limit talented
people [13, p. 156]. Moreover, Feyerabend [13] noted
that any test or instrument for observation comprises
(speculative) beliefs that are inculcated in us through
education and upbringing.

exigencies of research, temperamental peculiarities, ties, then I can
give you such a principle. It will be empty, useless, and pretty
ridiculous-but it will be a "principle." It will be the "principle"
"anything goes” [p. 188].

Page 6284

3.2.5. Polanyi and Hesse: Scientific expertise is tacit
and cannot be written as methodological rules.
Polanyi [36] claimed that “[n]o rules can account for the
way a good idea is found for starting an inquiry, and there
are no firm rules either for the verification or the
refutation of the proposed solution of a problem” [p. 27].
For Polanyi, scientific activities are intuitive insights and
tacit knowledge, which cannot be written as rules.
Somewhat similarly, Hesse [37] noted the impossibility
of setting rules for science. He maintained that, whenever
such rules exist, they reflect individuals’ scientific
upbringing.

4. RMPs as hypothetical, instrumental, and
revisable
Despite the drawbacks mentioned above, logical
positivists’ lack of ability to establish absolute normative
rules does not mean that all methodological rules are
opinion-based or that RMPs are irrational [28]. Rather,
Laudan [38] suggested that RMPs are like any other
empirical and conceptual problems in science.
According to his view, RMPs and RMGs should be as
open to testing, like any other scientific theory,
hypothesis, or proposition. In addition, scientific
theories, hypotheses, and propositions are not “fixed
once and for all” [p. 353], but instead, may be revisable
in light of the evidence. Similarly, RMPs and RMGs
should also be tentative and revisable. Research methods
are theory laden [20] and subject to Quine’s [18] problem
of reductionism. This explains why two scholars can
disagree about a certain RMP even if they are
considering the same evidence and share the same
scientific aims.
If RMPs are hypothetical and revisable in light of
evidence regarding how effectively they promote the
goals of science, then the key issue for each RMP is its
evidence [28]. Different methodological principles can
be effective for promoting different aims; therefore, each
RMP is linked to and promotes a specific goal. For
Laudan [39], selecting a RMP rationally requires
choosing a method that best promotes a specific goal in
science. Moreover, for Laudan, an RMP is not chosen in
a comparative vacuum. Instead, RMPs are selected based
on a variety of criteria for acceptance, testing, and use,
by using available evidence [40]. Laudan [38] suggested
that a decision is rational when an individual perceives
that certain RMPs are more likely to realize the goals of
an inquiry than the alternatives are. In the next section,
we discuss the challenges of applying Laudan’s program
in IS RMGs for qualitative study, design science and
mixed methods.

5. The challenges of Laudan’s normative
naturalism in IS
Laudan [41] suggested that the principles of research
methods are hypothetical imperatives formulated as
follows:
“If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently
promoted certain cognitive ends, e, in the past, and
rival actions, n, [have] failed to do so, then assume
that future actions follow the rule. If you[r] aim is e,
you ought to do m[, which is] more likely to promote
those ends than those actions based on the rule: if
you[r] aim is e, you ought to do n.” [28]
Doppelt [42] criticized Laudan, stating that all principles
of RMGs are hypothetical imperatives. [44] maintained
that, due to Quine’s underdetermination, there are basic
methodological standards that are justified, even if they
lack conclusive empirical evidence for being the most
effective means of achieving the research aims. If this
suggestion is accepted, then not all principles of RMGs
are hypothetical imperatives and some are basic
methodological standards.
Laudan [43] and Resnik [44] found this reasoning
wanting, as do we. Principles of RMGs can be
underdetermined based on evidence. The implication of
underdetermination, if accepted, is that researchers can
challenge that a certain principle, X, is better than Y for
achieving an outcome; however, this does not challenge
the idea that RMGs are hypothetical imperatives [43],
[44]. A practical concern of normative naturalism is that
scholars cannot survey all the available methods to select
the one that is best-suited to a specific study; we simply
lack the cognitive competence for this task [45].
We see three other concerns in applying Laudan’s
normative naturalism [43] in IS. First, while the specific
yet various aims in (say) physics or cancer research may
be well understood, it is not clear that this is the case in
IS. We are afraid that the primary “aim” in IS is “how to
publish in top IS journals,” and the guidelines are
intended to help with this.
The second challenge, which is not specific to IS, is
that the methods may distort the reality. For example, “all
statistical models include a number of assumptions about
the underlying data generating process, sampling and the
observed distributions, that are, strictly speaking, false”
[46 p. 441]. This means that methods (generally
speaking) are theoretically restricted. These assumptions
and restrictions are not understood in IS, perhaps because
the RMGs in IS are aimed at showing some RMPs as
accepted. Thus, the aim is not to deeply understand their
underlying assumptions, which distort the reality.
However, they need to be understood if we want to use
them as evidence for promoting certain cognitive goals.
As a concrete example, statistical significance is not the
same as practical significance. For example, the
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American Statistical Association (ASA) announced an
official warning for authors who employ statistical
significance tests uncritically: “Statistical significance is
not equivalent to scientific, human, or economic
significance” [47]. In medicine [48], “[t]he nonequivalence of statistical significance and clinical
importance has long been recognised” [p. 311]. As
another example, an article [49] noted, “Statistical
significance at any level does not prove medical,
scientific, or commercial importance” [p. 325].
The third issue concerns Laudan’s [39] normative
naturalism and its implications for cause and effect. This
issue is also important for any IS guideline, which
suggests that certain RMPs can be used to evaluate good
research. For Laudan, “[i]f one’s goal is y, then one ought
to do x” [p. 24] and “all methodological rules … can be
re-cast as [a] contingent statement of … [the]
connections between means and ends” [p. 25]. We argue
the following: If RMPs are normative, for example, then
they claim to say what is good qualitative research or
when mixed methods can be used. This claim implicitly
assumes cause and outcome (effect) relationships. If
design-science or interpretive research principles are
required for doing good science, then there is an assumed
causal relationship between RMG principles and
outcomes. Similarly, those reviewers who use the
guidelines to evaluate what acceptable science is
implicitly assume cause and outcome (effect)
relationships, where RMPs are the cause and good or
acceptable research is the outcome. Are there such causal
relationships? Is this even possible? To clarify this point,
let us consider the three following commonly recognized
causal capacities (or types of causation): 1) deterministic,
2) random, and 3) probabilistic causation [48 p. 522].
A deterministic causation “is one which, under
specifiable circumstances, always produces its effect”
[ibid]. Deterministic causality requires the existence of
true, 100% exceptionless laws. In psychological and
social phenomena, such as qualitative research, there are
no deterministic laws [50]. It is highly questionable to
claim that the RMPs are deterministic, that is, that they
cause the effect, namely the outcome of good research,
with no exceptions. This leaves us with two options: The
causation is probabilistic or random. “[P]robabilistic
capacity also operates only sometimes, but the strength
of the tendency to produce the effect is nomologically
fixed … [I]f there are genuinely random capacities, it is
obvious that there are capacities that cannot be reduced
to quantitative probabilities” [39 p. 522]. None of these
guidelines show probabilistic evidence, that for example,
with 85% likelihood, employing a certain RMP leads to
better results than following some other principle. This
is not a criticism of these guidelines: We doubt that
producing such evidence is possible at all. For example,
Thagard [51] suggested that causality in medical
research and psychology is complex, changing, and

above all, random. What is random causality? “A random
capacity sometimes produces its effect and sometimes
does not, but nature does not determine how often or how
regularly it does so” [39 p. 522]. To summarize, if there
are no deterministic or probabilistic causes between the
RMPs and the outcomes because the phenomenon is
indeterministic, then no philosophizing or tests can
establish it. This does not imply that the qualitative,
mixed-methods, or design-science research is
“unscientific.” Rather, it means that we should omit the
idea that certain RMPs produce or guarantee (i.e., cause)
good research. The implication is that the RMPs or
RMGs should have little normative effect on our journal
review process. Moreover, this does not mean that they
are useless; rather, they can have a pedagogical function,
for example, in PhD training.

6. Discussion
Next, we discuss five key problems emanating from
the “normativization” of methodological guidelines.

6.1. Clear and consistent guidelines
Hevner [15] noted that “it is vital that we as a research
community provide clear and consistent … guidelines …
for the design and execution of high quality design
science research projects … to establish the credibility of
IS design science research” [p. 87]. The problem with the
requirement for consistent guidelines is that it may force
design-science research into a uniform format that does
not allow for variety. This was noted by Klein and Myers
[6]: “[T]he complete literature of interpretive philosophy
comprises so many varied philosophical positions that it
is unlikely to yield one consistent set of principles for
doing interpretive research” [p. 70]. An additional
concern is the prohibition of creativity and out-of-thebox thinking, which can hinder scientific innovation.

6.2. Checkbox compliance
Klein and Myers [6] noted, “it is better to have some
principles than none at all, since the absence of any
criteria increases the risk that interpretive work will
continue to be judged inappropriately” [p. 68]. There is
also a risk that these guidelines will pave the way for
inappropriate judgements. The idea that, by reading an
article on a set of principles, readers can conduct and
evaluate research in the area is misleading and can lead
to checkbox compliance.
First, these guidelines may create a situation where
reviewers, without any hands-on expertise on
interpretive, design, or mixed-methods research, take on
the role of gatekeepers by simply using these guidelines
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as a checklist. Second, if paper acceptance in leading IS
journals requires compliance with these principles (to
meet “methodological rigor”), then what is required for
publication is not gained expertise on qualitative
research, but instead, how to demonstrate compliance
with the guidelines. If this is true, then it may lead to a
situation where the required methodological principle is
complying with the guidelines and not the mastery of,
say, interpretive research. Consequently, we may have IS
scholars whose primary qualitative “training” is reading
the guidelines, with a focus on strict compliance (to
maximize paper acceptance). We are afraid that this is
already the case.
Finally, what happens to creative and unexpected
research and any settings or circumstances that do not fit
the guidelines 4 ? More precisely, there is the risk that
noncompliance with the guidelines will be viewed as a
“lack of methodological rigor” or “flaw,” thereby leading
to rejection. If reviewers’ “challenge is to find the fatal
flaws” [52], then we are afraid that the bet is to find a
setting or circumstances where you can have 100%
compliance with a guideline. It could be that important
cases and settings are those complex and dynamic cases
that do not match well with any established guidelines.

6.3. Do the RMGs meet the standards they
impose?
As exemplified by [6], [7], and [8], many
RMGs/RMPs propose “validation” or “evaluation”
guidelines and ask the authors to validate their research
with different “rigorous” tests. At the same time, readers
can hardly find such “rigorous” evidence supporting the
RMPs in these articles. This makes readers wonder
whether the RMG articles meet the standards they set for
empirical research. The answer is that they do not meet
their principles. For example, Hevner et al. [7] suggest
comparisons with rival approaches, but they do not
consider doing this for their guidelines.

6.4. How should we regard the RMGs and their
principles?
One option concerning how we should regard the
RMGs and their principles is in line with Kuhn’s [19]
suggestion that the decisions about which RMPs are used
by a research community are irrational, so that a shift in
such norms is comparable to a religious “conversion
experience” [19]. As for those who agree with Polanyi
[31], they would perhaps deny the whole business of
4

For example, Venkatesh et al. [8] “summarize seven purposes for
mixed methods research that [the authors] adapted from prior research”
[p. 5], indicating that only these seven purposes are possible. Moreover,
“if researchers fail to provide and explain meta-inferences, the very

proposing a set of principles (and claim that the research
method competence is tacit). Laudan’s [28], [38]
approach would subject these principles to scientific
study. According to this view [38], research on
“methodology is the study of how to conduct inquiry
effectively” [p. 349]. According to Laudan [39], the key
question for scholars examining research methodologies
is understanding that “methodology rules are …
statements about instrumentalities, about effective means
for realizing cherished ends” [p. 24]. Given that RMGs
are like any other theories or set of propositions in
science, RMPs are testable to the same extent as any
other theories, hypotheses, and propositions in science
[38]. However, such tests have not been reported in IS.
Ultimately, if we cannot show any evidence that these
principles lead to better outcomes than their competitors,
then why should we require them?

6.5. The “authority” and “consistent with”
arguments
As a final point, many RMGs justify either individual
principles or the whole RMG with an authority
argument, such as “in our opinion” or “based on our
insights.” An authority argument is, for example, when
one declares an opinion without presenting the available
evidence to justify it. Readers may wonder whether the
RMPs, especially when they are used to regulate
research, are too important to be a matter of authority or
opinion. If RMGs contain rules that regulate what
“rigorous” practice is, and reviewers require authors to
follow them, then should such principles not only be
testable claims on how the RMPs are empirically
successful in achieving the specific goals? Instead,
should they also present evidence for (and against) the
approach? As elaborated on above, RMGs typically use
the “consistent with” argument, which is a questionable
approach to justification.

7. Conclusion
Methodological guidelines have been proposed for
both conducting and evaluating qualitative, designscience, and mixed-methods research. While these
guidelines require rigorous testing and validation, they
themselves do not meet these requirements. The
“evidence” for the guidelines consists of the authors’
opinion and showing that the principle is consistent with
some previously published research. The guidelines give
examples on the applicability of the principles, showing
objective of conducting a mixed methods research study is not
achieved” [p. 19]. Or consider, “IS researchers should employ a mixedmethods approach only when they intend to provide a holistic
understanding of a phenomenon for which extant research is
fragmented, inconclusive, and equivocal” [p. 36].”
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how they can be applied or how a study has applied them.
Neither focus counts as evidence for “conducting” and
“evaluating” good or high-quality research.
If the method guidelines are used for evaluation—as
they claim—then papers’ acceptance should not be based
on the authority argument, usability, or showing that the
principle is consistent with some papers. Moreover, there
is a risk that the guidelines have paved the way for
‘checkbox’ compliance, where research that meets the
principles are accepted and research that does not is
regarded as lacking methodological rigor. Our
experience suggest that this situation is common.
It is also important to ask why IS journals need to
present method guidelines when there are many research
method journals5? Do the IS guidelines add any value?
Finally, the philosophy of science regarding the scientific
method offers important lessons for IS. One option is
regarding each RMP as a tentative and revisable
principle that enjoys evidence for and against. This view
means that RMGs are similar to hypotheses in science
and have limited generalizability. This option, however,
seems to be impossible to achieve in the IS context of
mixed, design-science, and qualitative methods.
Alternatively, the Kuhnian approach is regarding RMGs
as dogmatic and irrational conventions. Our proposal is
considering the guidelines as idealizations, which are
useful for pedagogical purposes. This does not mean that
IS guidelines are useless, but rather, that they should
have less weight in evaluating what is an acceptable use
of method.
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